Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America by Lepow, C. Garrison
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 1 Article 3
12-1-1986
Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce
Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America
C. Garrison Lepow
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
C. G. Lepow, Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 32
(1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol62/iss1/3
Tax Policy For Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce
Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America
C. Garrison Lepow*
Last Christmas, Abie told Becky that he wanted a divorce in order to
marry someone else. As Becky pondered the meaning of the past and
Abie planned the present neither of them gave a thought to the future-
the tax law! It is understandable that the Internal Revenue Code'
("Code") may not top Abie and Becky's list of priorities during their di-
vorce negotiations. The amendments to the Code made by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (" 1984 Act") 2 as modified by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (" 1986 Act"), 3 however, will decide who bears the tax burden of
the separation, the "unscrambling"4 of their property, and the necessary
provisions for the support of their dependents.
For taxpayers with competent counsel and the right kind of prop-
erty/income profile, the Acts are a boon. In a well-structured settlement,
tax saving is split between the parties, with the low income spouse receiv-
ing cash to offset increased liability. No one loses but the Treasury. In
contrast, in a poorly structured settlement the tax burden can be shifted
to the ill-advised taxpayer, presumably the nonearner, or low income
spouse, without a compensating payment. In either case, the tax law re-
wards the pattern of divorce and remarriage for the high income tax-
payer. As there are generally no tax consequences at the time of the
divorce, the Code deceives the ill-advised taxpayer at the time when he
or she has the most bargaining power. Thereafter, the latent tax burden
will fall on the spouse who is in the most vulnerable economic position.5
In the context of a property settlement, the luckless taxpayer is likely to
be the spouse receiving low basis property, or cash, and hence, the tax
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1 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ("Code"), as amended, is cited by reference to section num-
bers only.
2 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (combining the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Tax Simplifica-
tion Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 795 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Act]. See
H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) reprinted in TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984, LAW AND CONTROLLING COMMITTEE REPORTS 65, 125,
336, 447 (CCH 1984) [hereinafter cited as TAX REFORM ACT (CCH)].
3 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, - Stat. - (1986) ("1986 Act"); H.R. 3838, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Technical Corrections Sept. 18, 1986. All citations to the 1986 Act are to
H.R. 3838 which became law on October 22, 1986.
4 Harris v. United States, 340 U.S. 106, 108 (1950).
5 Generally, under equitable apportionment statutes, divorce courts favor husbands in a prop-
erty settlement. See Rankin, Splitting the Assets Fairly in Divorce, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, at F1 1, col.
1. Divorced mothers experience an economic decline of 73% in their standard of living, while non-
custodial fathers achieve a 42% gain. Id. (citing L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985)).
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burden. The 1986 Act intensifies this result.6
Even the good intentions of Abie and Becky will not overcome the
design of the 1984 and 1986 Acts which fail to produce a fair division of
the tax burden. The development of a fair scheme of taxing the property
settlement is complicated by three factors: the statutory constraints of
the tax accounting rules which dictate when a gain will be taxed on an
exchange of property; the doctrine of assignment of income which pre-
vents taxpayers from shifting gain or income to other parties in order to
defeat the progressivity of the tax rates; and, the historic tax treatment of
alimony and property division as independent transactions rather than as
merely different aspects of the economic dissolution of a marital
partnership.
In the overly simplified terms necessary to introduce the statutory
mysteries that govern the lives of all the Abies and Beckys, the Code pro-
vides: (1) transfers of property do not create gain or loss for the trans-
feror7 and (2) within statutory limits, cash payments between former
spouses are income to the recipient s and deductible by the payor.9
The current federal law regulating the taxation of divorce was not
designed to achieve a tax neutral result.10 Congress passed the legisla-
6 Many of the changes, such as the elimination of the capital gains rate, will make nonrecogni-
tion more favorable than in the past. See H.R. 3838 Tit. III, Sec. 301(a) (exclusion for sixty percent
of long term capital gains repealed, I.R.C. § 1202); See also H.R. 3838 Tit. II(B), Sec. 211 (repeal of
regular investment tax credit); and H.R. 3838 Tit. V, Sec. 501 (limitation on interest deductions).
Also, the elimination of income averaging will increase the tax for spouses forced to sell their prop-
erty. H.R. 3838 Tit. I, Sec. 141 (repeal of income averaging, I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305). For the recipient
of a cash property settlement, the potential liability is even higher because it is now easier to convert
a property settlement into alimony. Despite these difficulties, many of the tax shelter possibilities of
marriage and divorce are still viable for the high income taxpayer.
7 See generally I.R.C. § 1041(a), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 314 (1984). See
also TAx REFORM ACr (CCH) 994. Butsee H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, §§ 421(b) & (c) (1986)
(gain is recognized when property subject to liability in excess of gain or subject to an installment
obligation is transfered to a trust).
8 See I.R.C. § 71; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1984). See also Tax
REFORM AcT (CCH) 995.
9 See I.R.C. § 215 (1982); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1984). I.R.C.
§ 71(0, amended by H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1843, § 422(c). See also Tax REFORM ACr (CCH)
997.
10 In the early 1980's, when a legislative response was first proposed, divorce tax litigation over-
whelmed the Tax Court. A study done in the first six months of 1982 found that 481 of the cases
docketed in the Tax Court related to divorce transfers. See American Bar Association's Domestic
Relations Tax Simplification Task Force, ABA Section of Taxation, The "Private Ordering" Concept in
Proposals for Simplification of Domestic Relations Tax Law 3 (August 2, 1982). The tax consequences of a
divorce transfer depended upon a hodgepodge of state and federal law and the trial judge's sense of
equity: The outcome of a particular case was unpredictable. See generally Serianni v. Commissioner,
765 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1985); Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 996 (1974); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Imel v. United States, 375
F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1974); Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1275 (1981); Schatz v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 292 (1981).
Much of the complexity of the Code developed in the course of the legislative process. This
process developed in two stages, each of which was controlled by a different group. Tax lawyers and
the Treasury collaborated on legislation which responded primarily to the needs of the tax adminis-
trators and the transferors of property in a divorce. These proposals took the form of a House Bill
introduced shortly before the Commission for Uniform State Laws approved passage of the Uniform
Marital Property Act inJuly, 1983. The legislative amendments from the Senate Finance Committee
staff came a year and a half later, and focused exclusively on finding new revenue sources by reduc-
ing the classes of taxpayers able to take advantage of the alimony deduction. These two distinct
groups of draftsmen did not collaborate in the legislative process. See I.R.C. § 71 (c)(2) & (f) (1984)
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tion in response to the Supreme Court's concept of a fair scheme for the
apportionment of tax in a property settlement. The Court, forced to ap-
ply the pre-1984 tax statute which did not distinguish divorce from other
transfers, formulated a tax structure which treated the property division
as a sale.I' Implicitly, the taxable transfer occurred in an unequal prop-
erty division. Hence, the transferor of property was the spouse liable for
tax due on the accumulation of the family wealth. In theory, this exacted
the tax from the party who retained the bulk of the marital wealth.' 2 In
practice, the individual resources of the transferor had no place in the
determination of the tax liability.13 Congress overruled the Court by
characterizing a property division as a gift rather than a sale. 14 The treat-
ment of a divorce related property division as a nontaxable transfer in-
stead of a sale simply has shifted the tax liability from the group which
suffered under prior law to their former spouses.
In the long run, the marital property settlement, including an eco-
nomic disentanglement which may take years to complete, cannot be
managed by a scheme in which gain or loss is taxed as a single property
transfer, whether a gift or a sale, of a jumble of assets which the ordinary
person would think of as owned jointly and needing only to be untangled
and divided. Characterizing it as a sale taxes the transfer between
spouses. Characterizing the property transfer as a gift defers recognition
of gain or loss until a subsequent taxable transfer. Either way the spouse
deemed to make the taxable transfer must account for all gain or loss.
However equitable the division of property behind the transfer, the tax
liability bears unfairly on one or the other spouse.
The dissolution of a marriage presents a myriad of related economic
problems, not the least of which is the potential tax liability affecting the
dollar amount each partner will recover from the marriage. At issue is
the apportionment of a shared tax liability between former marital part-
ners. Congress has failed to determine that issue directly.' 5
This article examines the impact of the tax laws after the complex
revisions of the Code in 1984 and 1986 on the domestic relations laws of
(amended by H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1843, § 422). See also infra note 15. The continuation of the
alimony deduction was seriously questioned by the Senate Finance Committee staff. See Sheppard,
Divorce in America is Not So Simple, 23 TAx NoTEs 1014 (June 4, 1984) (comments by Senate Finance
Committee Chief Counsel Roderick A. DeArment and staff tax counsel Harry Graham).
11 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
12 See Davis, 370 U.S. at 69-70 (comparison of spousal property rights of Mrs. Davis and her
counterpart in a community property state).
13 See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'dper curiam, 552
F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (tax depended on pre-divorce ownership of transferred property).
14 See I.R.C. § 1041.
15 In 1981, the Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force of the A.B.A.'s Section on
Taxation ("Task Force") presented a legislative solution to the unpredictable tax consequences of
divorce. See generally Preliminary Specification for Simplification, Technical Memorandum (May 17,
1981) (hereinafter cited as "Technical Memorandum"). Among other things, the Task Force pro-
posed that the parties to a divorce may elect "correlative tax" results by written agreement. Id. at 2,
11-14 app. III. In the absence of a written agreement, the parties would be subject to uniform and
mechanical federal rules governing the taxation of divorce transfers. Id. at 11. The mechanical rules
also proposed that transfers of property in the course of marriage or divorce not be taxable; that the
transfer of cash, including combined child and spousal support payments, be treated as alimony,
deductible by the payor and income to the recipient; that the transfer of community property for
cash be excluded from alimony treatment, while the satisfaction of marital rights in exchange for
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many states. Part I traces the history of the taxation of property settle-
ments. Part II provides an overview of property settlements under sec-
tion 1041. Part III discusses how section 1041 can function as a tax
shelter. Part IV examines the conversion of a cash property settlement
into alimony. Part V evaluates the exceptions to the nonrecognition sec-
tions. Part VI examines the issues that are not resolved under the Code.
Part VII suggests a legislative alternative to the present method of taxing
divorce transfers.
The article concludes that the revisions of the tax code relevent to
divorce diminish the property rights of the nonearner spouse under state
law and create a tax preference for the transferor of property willing to
structure his or her divorce settlement to take advantage of tax shelter
opportunities. The taxation of property settlements incident to divorce
is examined through a series of case studies based on the tax problems
encountered by Abie and Becky, an allegorical husband and wife in the
unhappy process of marital dissolution.
I. The Davis Legacy: Timing Decisions Lead to
Assignment of Income
Congress passed section 1041 of the Code fixing the tax conse-
cash be treated as alimony. Id. at 6-7 (rules define property to include community property but
exclude marital rights).
The rules proposed by the Task Force were largely incorporated in H.R. 3475, a bill to achieve
tax simplification, introduced in the House in June 1983. See H.R. 3475, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). The resolution excluded both the transfer of marital rights and the transfer of community
property for cash from alimony treatment. On October 4, 1983, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee deleted this exclusion thereby making possible the treatment of transfers of both marital and
community property rights as alimony. See News Release, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives 4 (October 5, 1983). The amendment also introduced the alimony recap-
ture rules. Id The recapture was triggered if a property settlement exceeding $15,000 was paid in
less than three years and did not meet certain statutory requirements. The House Ways and Means
Committee, however, did not amend the proposal permitting combined spousal and child support
payments to be treated as alimony. Id.
The simplification provisions of H.R. 3475, including the divorce provisions, were incorporated
into the more ambitious bill, H.R. 4170, which Congress eventually enacted as the Tax Reform Act
of 1984. The full House passed H.R. 4170 on April 11, 1984 and the Senate approved the same
provisions, now known as Title IV(B) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, on May 17, 1984. De-
spite the approval of identical provisions by both the House and the Senate, the Conference Com-
mittee substituted entirely different provisions, including one denying alimony treatment for direct
payment of combined spousal and child support payments and one increasing recapture to $10,000
and six years. The later amendments of the 1984 Act, drafted to achieve deficit reduction, all but
eliminated the alimony deduction. Compare I.R.C. § 71(c) (1982) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984)) with H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. Tit. IV, § 423. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also TAx REFORM AcT (CCH) 995 n.8 (citing Commissioner v. Lester, 366
U.S. 299 (1961) (combined spousal and child support payment taxed as alimony)). The cash only
alimony provision was orginally drafted to achieve tax simplification. H.R. 3475 (Tax Simplification
Act of 1983), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The provision, unchanged by the Senate, was drastically
amended by the Joint Finance Committee shortly before the dawn passage of the Act on June 23,
1984. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1984, at 8, col. 3; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess.
(1984); see also TAx REFORM AcT (CCH) 997;J. EusTjCE, THE TAx REFoRM Act OF 1984 1-14 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as EUsTE]. The full Congress approved the Conference version of H.R. 4170 on
June 23, 1984 (H.R. CoN. REs. 328, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)). The bill became law on July 18,
1984. Congress restored the liberal deduction rules for property settlements in a technical correc-
tion to the 1986 Act. H,R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1843, § 422(c) (amending I.R.C. § 71(f)). The 1986
Act cut the time required to avoid alimony recapture from six to three years, raised the exempt
amount of payments from $10,000 to $15,000 per year and limited recapture to the third year only.
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quences of property settlements with the express purpose of reversing
United States v. Davis, 16 under which the Supreme Court held that the
transfer of appreciated property to satisfy spousal property rights in a
divorce resulted in an immediate recognition of gain for the transferor.' 7
Under Davis, the timing of the recognition of gain or loss was fixed at
divorce. However, the Court was not merely deciding when gain was
properly recognized18 but also who would bear the entire tax burden of
the division.' 9 Hence, by requiring the recognition of gain on divorce,
the Court unequivocally assigned the tax burden to one party, the
transferor.2 0
To reach this result, the Court deemed that the inchoate marital
rights satisfied by the property transfer were themselves property. 2' It
followed that the exchange of the husband's stock for the release of his
wife's claim was treated as if the wife actually had transferred property,
for example a new car, for her husband's appreciated stock. The tax con-
sequences determined under the Davis case result from two separate but
simultaneous transactions. The first transaction is the husband's sale of
stock on which gain or loss is recognized.2 2 The second transaction is his
purchase of the new property at fair market value. 23 Thus, the husband
was treated as if he sold the stock for cash and later exchanged the cash
for the car. Because Mrs. Davis paid the full fair market value of the
stock, her basis in the stock was also the fair market value.24 Upon her
resale of the stock at the same market value, the Davis analysis normally
precluded gain recognition to the wife.25 Hence, the appreciation in the
property was taxed once, and it was taxed entirely to the transferor hus-
band upon divorce.
The majority opinion clearly assigned the income tax burden on the
appreciation of the property to the transferor husband. 26 Deferring the
recognition of gain until a sale by the recipient would have shifted the tax
burden unfairly to the recipient wife.27 The shift is unfair because state
16 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983).
17 Id. at 70.
18 Id. at 68.
19 Id. at 69.
20 Id. at 68, 73.
21 Id. at 72. In Davis, the fact that the value of the marital rights received was unknown did not
change the outcome. In order to value the marital rights, the Davis court adopted the reasoning of
Philidelphia Park and presumed that in an arm's length transaction the fair market value of the
properties exchanged are equal. See Philadelphia Amusement Park Co. v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Davis, 370 U.S. at 72. Accord United States v. General Shoe, 282 F.2d 9
(6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1943). In accordance with the reasoning in Philadelphia Park, the recipient wife is treated as
an ordinary purchaser for value.
22 Id. at 69. The Court analyzed property rights in common law and community property states
and concluded that the wife had no vested right during marriage. Id. at 69-70.
23 Id.
24 I.R.C. § 1012 (cost basis).
25 See generally I.R.C. §§ 1001(a) (gain equals the amount realized less basis) & 1001(b) (amount
realized includes the value of property received). If the basis equals fair market value and the prop-
erty is sold at fair market, the amount of gain, according to I.R.C. § 1001, is zero. See Rev. Rul. 67-
221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
26 Davis, 370 U.S. at 70.
27 Id. at 70-71. The wife's entitlement under the Delaware divorce law was to a "reasonable"
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law values the wife's property rights, as well as the transferred property,
at their fair market value at the time of the transfer, not at their cost basis
to the transferor. For example, assume that the Davis property subject to
division on divorce consisted of stock A worth $100, with a basis of $30,
and stock B, worth $100, with a basis of $20, and $100 cash. If the prop-
erty had been divided using basis, rather than fair market value, the mari-
tal assets would have been valued at $150. Assuming a one-third
interest, the wife's share would have been worth $50, compared to her
actual share of $100 worth of martial assets.28
In contrast to the Davis transfer, equal divisions of community or
jointly held property were treated as nontaxable partitions of property
rather than as a transfers.29 Because the spouse who was awarded the
property in the divorce settlement was merely retaining his or her owner-
ship (albeit in the form of individual rather than shared ownership), the
original basis of the property was unchanged by the divorce settlement.30
Consequently, gain or loss was not recognized at divorce, but upon a
subsequent sale by the recipient of the property involved.31 Taxation on
the appreciation in the community or jointly owned property was de-
ferred. Ultimately the appreciation was taxed to the recipient of the as-
set. Thus, under prior law, the marital domicile determined whether the
transferor was taxed on a property division.3 2
Whatever equities prompted the Davis holding, the Supreme Court
clearly used the issue of when the gain would be reported to determine
who would be taxed. Using the issue of timing to regulate the assign-
ment of income between the divorced husband and wife generally results
in an unequal allocation of tax liability between the husband and wife.33
portion of the property owned by the marital unit on the date of the division. Id. at 70. The Court
noted that Mrs. Davis had no right to manage or dispose of her husband's property and that her
right to the property was "not descendable." Id.
28 In such case, one has no doubt that the wife's claim would be satisfied in cash. See id. at 67.
29 See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158, 159 (jointly held property); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1
C.B. 213 (community property); see also Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190, 1192
(S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd. mem., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
30 See Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965). The basis of a divided asset is the
percentage of the asset received multiplied by the community's pre-divorce basis in the asset. But see
Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213, 214.
31 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (gain from sale of property included in gross income); I.R.C. §§ 1001(a)
(recognition and computation of gain) & 1001 (c) (amount realized defined).
32 See Davis, 370 U.S. at 71. The Supreme Court acknowledged a geographical disparity in the
tax treatment accorded divorced taxpayers in the various states. Id. at 70.
33 Compare Davis, 370 U.S. at 69-70 with Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978)
(wife's claim that husband transferred separate property found inconsistent with her position taken
in state court). The tax results under the Davis principle became erratic when the federal and state
laws did not mix well. Inequitable division of the tax burden was not the only problem under Davis.
For example, the decision did not apply in a common law state normally adhering to the Davis princi-
ple when by chance the property transferred upon divorce was coincidentally returned to its original
owner. Cook v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 512 (1983) (rescission theory applied to marital contract
avoided Davis); See Seriani v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1985) (wife with special eq-
uity in stock recognized gain on corporate liquidation); Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th
Cir. 1979) (special equity under Florida law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); Commissioner v.
Collins, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969) (highest state court held property vested prior to division);
Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D.Colo. 1973), aft'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) (prop-
erty vested before divorce). But see Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir.) (Davis
applied to identical Kansas statute; no state decision on vesting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974);
Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.) (Iowa statute), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971);
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The unpredictable tax consequences meant that one former spouse
could shift the tax burden of a divorce settlement causing an unantici-
pated liability for the other side and a windfall for the taxpayer sliding
through the gap left by conflicting state divorce law and the federal tax
law.3 4 As a result, the tax collector often was "whipsawed" between
spouses claiming inconsistent tax positions.3 5
II. Development of Section 1041
The traditional distinction between the non-deductible payment for
property rights, commonly called the property settlement, and tax de-
ductible support obligations imposed by law, called alimony, has been
abandoned by the 1984 amendments to the Code. The essential require-
ments under prior law-that the payment be for the support of the recip-
ient, and that it be paid pursuant to a legal obligation owed to a former
spouse under state law 36-are no longer required under the current fed-
eral definition of alimony. 37 This change in the definition of alimony
means that a cash settlement of property rights under state law may be
structured as alimony for federal income tax purposes, 38 making the new
Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350
(9th Cir. 1977) (exchange of separate property-the proceeds of the loan-for the mortgaged com-
munity property was a taxable event); Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979). Compare Gerlach
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 156 (1970) (separate cash exchange for community interest was taxable)
with Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953) (community cash exchanged for
other community property was not taxable).
34 See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357, 1368 (1980) (payment labeled "support" held
property division).
35 See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983). If property had a basis of$10 and a
fair market value of$100, the transferor did not report his or her gain of $90 and the recipient took a
stepped up basis of $100 on the subsequent resale of the property received in a divorce settlement,
likewise not reporting the gain of $90. Id. at 198. Under § 1041, geography no longer affects tax
liability. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 192 (1983).
36 Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.71-1T(a), A-3 (1984). See LaBow v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 125 (2d
Cir. 1985) (payments pursuant to order stayed by appeal-not legal obligation, not alimony); I.R.C.
§ 71(a) (1982) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422(d), 98 Stat. 798 (1984); Green v. Commis-
sioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1986-269; Gable v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1985-423.
37 Section 71 of the Code defines alimony or separate maintenance payments as any payment in
cash if
(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce or separa-
tion instrument,
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate such payment as a pay-
ment which is not includible in gross income under this section and not allowable
as a deduction under section 215,
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor spouse are
not members of the same household at the time such payment is made, and
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after the death of the
payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or property)
as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse.
I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (1984) (amended by H.R. 3838 Tit XVIII, Sec. 1843, § 422(b) which deleted the
parenthetical, "and the divorce or separation instrument states that there is no such liability," from
the end of subsection D).
38 Compare H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 195 (1983) (recapture rule enacted to pre-
vent property settlement disguised as alimony); Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.
1974); Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1 with Riddell v. Guggen-
heim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960) (payments for share of community property not alimony); Yoa-
kum v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 128 (1984) (alimony denied where payment attributable to property
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law the antithesis of prior law.3 9
Under the alimony provisions of section 71, Congress has devised a
substantial income shifting option available to the transferor spouse. In-
stead of the earner spouse recognizing a gain on the buyout of his or her
spouse's marital rights, as under the pre-1984 rule,40 the transferor who
pays cash has an above-the-line deduction.41 The recipient, in place of a
tax-free receipt upon liquidation of the marriage,42 has gross income.43
However, the formal requirements for alimony treatment can be expen-
sive in terms of liquidity.44 But even where liquidity is a problem, Con-
gress has sweetened the tax result for the transferor spouse. Property
transfers between spouses or former spouses in connection with divorce
no longer result in a taxable event for the transferor.45 Under current
law, tax liability for the recipient of a property transfer is not triggered by
the divorce decree; the liability, however, lies dormant in the property, to
arise, perhaps unexpectedly, sometime after the divorce.
The economic protection provided for the nonearner spouse by
state community property or marital property laws, 46 and formerly incor-
porated into the federal definitions of property settlement and alimony,47
rights); Goninen v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 737 (1983); Dom v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1545 (1983) (noncontingent payments not to exceed 10 years not treated as alimony); Wells-
Lee v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 (1966) (payment designated alimony by state court
taxed as property settlement).
39 Under prior law, the Code defined alimony as payments made "in recognition of the general
obligation to support." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1960). Payments related to property division
were excluded from alimony treatment because they were not for support. See H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-85 (1942); Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1982) (under partnership
dissolution theory periodic payments were return of capital-the quid pro quo of surrendered prop-
erty rights is but one factor to consider). But see H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-96
(1983) (recapture prevents deduction of one-time payment of property settlement).
A transfer made pursuant to a property division was neither income to the recipient nor deducti-
ble by the transferor. See Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1972); Campbell v.
Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349, 351 (3d Cir.
1953); Mills v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Thompson
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 522, 525 (1968); see also Schatz v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 292,
296 (1981); Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 924, 929 (1960).
40 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
41 See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), A-5 (1984) (equal division not required
to avoid recognition of a gain or loss). Compare Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 and Rev. Rul. 74-
347, 1974-2 C.B. 26 with H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 192 (1983) (nonrecognition of
gain or loss applies whether or not property is equally divided).
42 Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (exchange of marital rights not taxable event).
43 See I.R.C. § 71(a) (alimony is gross income to the recipient); I.R.C. § 71(f) (anti-front loading
rules limit lump sum deductions to $15,000, subject to recapture, after December 31, 1986, and to
$10,000 after January 31, 1984 but before January 1, 1987). See H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1843,
§ 422(c).
44 See I.R.C. § 7 1(a) (cash only required for alimony treatment).
45 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), A-10 (1984).
46 See, e.g., Wis. Mar. Prop. Act, 1983 Wis. Act 186, 1985 Wis. Act 37, Wis. STAT. ANN. 766.31(3)
(West 1986) (equal ownership of marital property).
47 White v. Commissioner, 770 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1985) (intent as to tax burden irrelevent);
Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976) (payments made by husband on wife's life
insurance policy not includable in gross income of wife); Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357
(1980) (payment labeled "support" held property division). See Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1275, 1285 (1981) (both lump sum and installment payments held division of marital capital);
Broida v. United States, 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5675 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Weiner v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 155 (1973); Jackson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 125, 129-30 (1970); Dorsey v. Commissioner,
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has been diluted by the sui generis federal definition in the new law of
property settlement and alimony.48 This variance between state and fed-
eral law makes divorce planning complex in itself.49
The 1984 Act causes odd results, or some might say inevitable re-
sults, according to the taxpayer's bracket and family status. In compari-
son to the past law, the alimony deduction has now become less available
to middle income taxpayers with children, but more available to wealthy
taxpayers using alimony trusts.50 Such obscure provisions may have
been avoided if the drafting process were not divorced from the political
process. The two year legislative process, which did not include a single
public hearing on divorce taxation, determined fundamental social is-
sues, such as whether the transfer of community property for cash, or the
cash payment of child support, should result in taxable income, as if they
were neutral points of tax simplification. 5' The economic impact on di-
vorced taxpayers is hardly neutral.
A. How Section 1041 Works
The Code provides that gain or loss is not recognized on the transfer
of property between spouses during marriage.5 2 Even after a marriage is
dissolved, the gain or loss is not recognized if the transfer is made in
connection with divorce. 53 It follows from the nonrecognition rule that it
50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1371 (1985) (held an award paid over six years, not contingent on death or remar-
riage, lump sum alimony, hence not taxable; Mississippi does not grant property rights on divorce).
48 Compare I.R.C. § 71 with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 236 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
49 Application of the revised Code provisions is also complex. See generally EusTCE, supra note
15, at 1-7. See also supra note 10. For example, although most alimony payments qualify for the
deduction, the Code contains stringent requirements governing the deduction of combined child
support/alimony payments and direct alimony payments over $15,000 per year. See I.R.C.
§§ 71 (c)(2) & 71(f). In contrast, these latter provisions do not apply to alimony paid through trusts.
See I.R.C. § 682. The final version of the tax provisions governing direct alimony payments do not
match the alimony trust provisions. The first Technical Corrections Act did not alter the trust pat-
tern. See H.R. Con. Res. 328, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). One surmises that the clash between the
alimony trust and the direct alimony tax provisions was unplanned, and the legislators favoring an
alimony deduction formed a natural constituency to protect the trust provision from the severe limi-
tations applicable to direct alimony payments. The alimony trust provisions, originally a replica of
the direct alimony provisions, were not amended by the 1984 Act. Compare I.R.C. § 682(a) (trust
provisions) with H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1984) (alimony provisions).
50 Compare I.R.C. § 71(f) with I.R.C. § 682. Compare also I.R.C. § 71(c) (1983) (amended by Pub.
L. No. 98-369 § 422, 98 Stat. 795 (1984) with I.R.C. § 682(a). See I.R.C. § 682(b) (the portion of
I.R.C. relating to child support is the same as prior law). I.R.C. § 682(a) was not amended by the
1984 Act. The 1986 Act added a cross reference in I.R.C. § 682 to I.R.C. § 71 (direct alimony). See
H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1843, § 422(a) (adding § 6 8 2 (g)(1)). The alimony deduction is less avail-
able to low and middle income taxpayers with children than those without children. Compare Com-
missioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961) (combined payments for the support of former spouse and
children treated entirely as alimony) with I.R.C. § 71 (c) (payments related to milestone in child's life
deemed child support).
51 EuSTCE, supra note 15 at 1-8. There were no hearings on the 1986 provisions affecting
alimony.
52 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a), A-2 (1984) (transfers between spouses including those
whose divorce was never considered). But see id., ex. 3 (1984) (transfer between spouse and a corpo-
ration owned by other spouse taxable). A transaction between a spouse and a corporation con-
trolled by the other spouse may be recharacterized by application of common law principles such as
the step transaction theory. Id. For example, if Abie transferred property to a corporation owned by
Becky and then the corporation distributed the property to Becky, the step transaction doctrine
would recharacterize the transaction as one between Abie and Becky.
53 I.R.C. §§ 1041(a) & (c). See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(b), A-6 (1984). Property ac-
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is impossible for a husband and wife to engage in a taxable exchange.54
The recipient of property is denied a step up in basis for the property
acquired from his or her spouse. The form of ownership of property as
jointly or separately owned under state marital regimes55 or contract
law56 is irrelevant to the application of section 1041. 5 7 Whether the
property is exchanged in satisfaction of marital property rights, 58 for
other property,59 or for cash is equally irrelevant. 60 Furthermore, unlike
the old community property rule, section 1041 does not require the
property division itself to be equal. 61
quired after divorce and transferred to a former spouse in connection with a divorce is subject to
I.R.C. § 1041. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a), A-5 (1984); see also id. at A-8 (annulments treated
as divorces).
54 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-iT, A-I (1984); but see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), A-2
ex. 3 (1984); id- at A-3 (corporation owned by spouse); id. (nonresident alien). See infra note 121
(transfer in trust of either an asset subject to liability in excess of basis or an installment obligation
results in recognition of gain under H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, § 421) and infra notes 164-170
and accompanying text.
Section 1041 applies to transfers of property made afterJuly 18, 1984, unless a transfer is pur-
suant to an agreement made on or before that date. Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(f), A-15 (1984).
Pursuant to the transition rules, § 1041 may be elected by an agreement between spouses in two
circumstances: transfers made after July 18, 1984 pursuant to an agreement predating the enact-
ment, or any transfer made during 1984. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(f), A-16 (1984). Such an
election is irrevocable and must cover all property transferred within the time period for the elec-
tion. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(f), A-17 (1984). The election is made by attaching a statement
signed by both spouses, or former spouses, to the tax return of the transferor for the year in which
the first transfer is made. If later transfers are made, a copy of the statement must be attached to
future tax returns. A statement must contain both parties' social security number, and a copy of the
statment must be kept by each party. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(g), A-18 (1984) sets forth an
example of an acceptable election form.
In addition to timing considerations, the applicability of § 1041 is also conditioned on the prop-
erty being transferred pursuant to divorce. For example, Abie owns timberland in Southern Oregon
with a basis of $144,000 and a fair market value of $1,000,000. Abie transfers the land to Becky in
exchange for her promise to transfer land, unspecified at the time of the grant, to Abie worth
$1,000,000 within five years from the date of the divorce. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341
(9th Cir. 1979). Neither Abie nor Becky recognize gain. See I.R.C. § 1041(a). Here both properties
are subject to the nonrecognition provision of section 1041 even though one parcel is acquired after
the dissolution of the marriage. Were the transfer not related to divorce, the transaction would be
taxable. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (limits Starker: property identified 45 days and exchanged 180 days).
The Code expressly provides that all transfers within one year after the divorce is final are conclu-
sively presumed to be divorce related. I.R.C. § 1041(c)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(b), A-
6(1) (1984). Transfers made over a year after the divorce may be factually connected to the divorce,
and hence, trigger § 1041. I.R.C. § 1041(c)(2); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(b), A-7 (1984). Ac-
cording to the temporary regulations, a transfer not required by the divorce instrument which occurs
six years after divorce is final is presumed not incident to divorce. Id. The taxpayer can rebut the
presumption, for instance, by showing that a problem in clearing tide caused the delay. Id.
55 See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'd per cuam, 552
F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (prior law required tracing of the source of property transferred); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), A-10 (1984) (I.R.C. § 1041 produces result "different" from Davis).
56 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), A-10 (1984) (Davis overruled).
57 See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), A-10 (1984); cf. Cook v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 512 (1983).




61 Id. I.R.C. § 1041 does not require an equal division. Prior law required a roughly equal divi-
sion of community assets between the parties. See Harrah v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 187
(1982) (wife claiming community ownership of assets cannot claim stepped up basis); Carson v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1978) (mathematical certainty is not required in nontaxable
divisions: 46.2:53.8 split of community property not taxable); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Section 1041 was designed to work in the simple case of the tradi-
tional marriage where the husband owns property and transfers a portion
to his wife,62 or where both husband and wife own community property
and the husband cashes out the wife's vested interest with separate as-
sets,63 typically the proceeds of a loan obtained by mortgaging the com-
munity property. For example, assume that Abie owns 200 shares of
stock with a basis of $1 per share and a fair market value of $2 per share
and Becky owns no property. In an equal division of assets under prior
law, Abie's transfer of 100 shares to Becky, whereby each receives $200
worth of stock, results in recognized gain for Abie of $100.64 Abie holds
his remaining shares with a basis of $100 and a fair market value of
$200.65 Unlike Abie, Becky receives stock worth $200 with a basis of
$200.66
Under section 1041, Abie and Becky end up in changed circum-
stances after the transfer. Gain or loss is not recognized on the transfer.
By applying section 1041 to an identical transfer of 100 shares of stock
from Abie to Becky, Abie does not recognize a gain.67 Each retains $200
worth of stock with a basis of $100 which is automatically derived from
Abie's basis before the transfer. 68 If either sells the stock for $200, he or
she recognizes a gain of $100.
Should Abie transfer depreciated property-stock with a fair market
of $50 and a basis of $100-section 1041 does not allow recognition of
the loss. 69 Instead, the tax loss inherent in Abie's basis crosses over to
Becky.70 The basis rules of section 1041 do not impede the recognition
of loss by the recipient spouse.71 Hence, on the sale of the stock for $50,
Becky recognizes a loss of $50. Abie has identical treatment of the shares
of stock he retains. In contrast, prior law obviated the issue of assign-
ment of tax losses through the basis rules which provided that the recipi-
ent's basis would be the fair market value of the property at the date of
transfer. 72 The transferor could not deduct the loss because section 267
did not allow losses between related parties. If the transfer occurred af-
ter divorce, the parties were no longer related and the loss could be
(1935) (allocation of different community assets to each spouse not taxable). See also Rev. Rul. 76-
83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 ($516 of separate property exchanged in a $300,000 division held not taxable).
62 I.R.C. § 1041(a) (overrules Davis).
63 I.R.C. § 1041(a) (overrules Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979) and Carrieres v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977)).
64 See Davis, 370 U.S. at 66.
65 I.R.C. § 1012 (cost basis). Abie gets no step up in basis because there was no transfer of
property.
66 Id.; see Davis, 370 U.S. at 73 (Becky is treated as a purchaser for value).
67 I.R.C. § 1041(a).
68 I.R.C. § 1041(b). In the case of a transfer of appreciated property, Becky's basis under § 1041
is comparable to the basis rules applicable to property acquired by gift. Compare I.R.C. § 1041(b)
(spouse's basis, no adjustment for gift tax) with I.R.C. § 1015(a) (donor's basis adjusted for a portion
of gift tax).
69 I.R.C. § 1041(a).
70 I.R.C. § 1041(b).
71 Id.; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T, A-I (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192
(1983).




The transfer of a tax loss under section 1041 differs from the result
under the general rules governing the basis of property acquired by
gift. 74 Ordinarily under section 1015, regulating nonspousal gratuitous
transfers, the donor cannot transfer a tax loss because the donee's basis
is the lower of the donor's basis or the fair market value of the property
at the date of the gift, $50 in the above example.
B. A Real Life Division Under Section 1041
Although it is unusual for the marital property to consist of highly
liquid and fungible assets having an equal fair market value and equal
bases, it is common for both spouses to own property. Section 1041 co-
incidentally may produce an equal division of the tax burden, as in the
ideal cases, or it may produce a variety of unequal divisions when the tax
consequences of the property transfer are taken into account. A prop-
erty settlement is normally difficult for the couple whose assets are not
capable of division. In such circumstances, the parties could sell the as-
sets to a third party and split the proceeds, divide the assets between
themselves, or distribute all the assets to one spouse who would then buy
out the other spouse's interest.
The first alternative results in a taxable transaction immediately. 75
The division of the net proceeds of the sale will produce an equal divi-
sion of both the property and tax burden.76 Under the second and third
alternatives, tax is deferred. 77 In the second alternative, although the
market value of the assets is the same, their value after taxes may differ
substantially. By transferring assets with a low or high basis, the trans-
feror spouse can also transfer the bulk of the tax burden to his or her
former spouse.78 The last alternative creates a tax liability for the spouse
73 See I.R.C. §§ 165(c) & 262. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a) (1964) (disallowing deduction for losses
recognized on nonresidential non-business, non-income producing property). Generally in a taxa-
ble property division under prior law where the transfer occurred after the divorce, Abie would
recognize the loss. However, if the transfer occurred before the divorce was final, the loss in prop-
erty transferred between husband and wife was disallowed. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947) (tax motive relevant); Merritt v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir.
1968) (lack of tax avoidance motive irrelevant). See also I.R.C. §§ 267(a), (b)(1) & (c)(4); H.R. 3838
Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, § 421(a) (adding I.R.C. § 267(g). Pursuant to Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041(a)-
IT(b), A-6 (1984), the timing of the transfer-before or after the divorce-was determined by state
property law. See generally Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904, 911 (1976) (title passed with bene-
fits and burdens of ownership, not deed).
74 See I.R.C. § 1015(a). Compare I.R.C. § 1041(b) (recipient takes donor's basis) with I.R.C.
§ 1015(a) (lower of donor's basis or fair market value at transfer).
75 I.R.C. § 1001(a).
76 Example: Abie and Becky own appreciated property with a basis of $200 and fair market
value of $400. On sale to a third party, the couple, or either of them, recognizes a gain of $200
which will be subject to tax. The remaining proceeds are divided equally.
77 The tax deferral possibility depends upon the recipient having income from other sources.
For the recipient in need of cash immediately, the deferral is illusory.
78 Assume again that the fair market value of stocks A and B is $100 and their bases are $10 and
$75, respectively. The transfer of stock A to Becky on divorce will not cause immediate recognition
of gain. Under the 1986 Code, if one assumes capital gain treatment and a 50% tax rate, Becky
bears a tax cost of $18 and nets $82 upon divorce. However, should Becky retain stock B, her
potential gain is only $25. The tax cost is $5 and her net receipt is $95. Under the 1986 Act,
assuming no capital gain preference and a 28% tax rate, Becky's cost rises to $26 for stock A or $7
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acquiring the property, while allowing the other spouse tax free proceeds
from the transfer. 79 Hence, the carryover basis principle forces upon an
apparently equal division of property a future and concealed tax result.80
Upon the sale of the asset this concealed tax liability will unbalance the
planned financial distribution by altering the net value of the property.
The inequity of the new section 1041 parallels the inequity of the
Davis case. Marital assets are divided, but only one spouse carries the tax
burden. All the gain once recognized by the transferor under Davis is
now recognized by the recipient under section 1041. Thus Davis is sim-
ply turned on its head; the coin, however, remains the same.
Contrast the result under section 1041 with a system that would
compensate either spouse for the receipt of property carrying a low basis
or other undesirable tax attributes. Where two assets each worth $1,000
have respective bases of $100 and $900, in theory one can achieve an
accurate division of property by simply aggregating the bases according
to the fair market value of the property. In the above example, such divi-
sion of both property and basis would cause each party in an equal divi-
sion to receive property worth $1,000 with a basis of $500 and a
potential gain of $500. One way to achieve such economic parity may be
to permit the election of a substituted basis.81 The problem obviously is
that such an option will require exquisite accounting. However, the diffi-
culty is obviated by section 71. The expedience of a compensating non-
taxable cash payment can be used to even the financial value of a
property settlement. Thus, a property settlement with a respective po-
tential tax burden of $900 for Becky and $100 for Abie, can be made into
an equal division of net value of the property if Abie pays Becky $400.82
The nonrecognition and carryover basis rules of section 1041 apply
for stock B. Abie's tax cost on a subsequent sale of the asset retained by him will be the mirror
image of Becky's. Hence, if Becky's tax cost in 1986 is higher, here $18, his is lower, here $5.
79 Assume that Abie and Becky own the stock as community property and both assets are trans-
ferred to Abie. Under pre-1984 law, Becky realizes and recognizes a gain because co-owned prop-
erty is not divided in kind, in particular the borrowed cash is Abie's separate property. After divorce
Abie's property is subject to the mortgage. See Commissioner v. Siewert, 72 T.C. 326 (1979); Car-
rieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th
Cir. 1977). Section 1041 changes that result. Becky does not recognize a gain and Abie's basis is the
community basis immediately before the transfer. Gain recognition awaits a subsequent sale. Then
the gain will be recognized entirely by Abie. The recipient spouse will have credit for the holding
period of the transferor. H.R. 3838 Tit. VI(C), Sec. 621(a) (amending I.R.C. § 382).
80 See I.R.C. § 1041(b).
81 See Simmons, Federal Income Taxation of Wealth Transfers on Divorce: A Policy Analysis and Proposal,
37 Sw. LJ. 941 (1984). A distribution from a qualified pension plan divided before the effective date
of the Pension Equity Act of 1984 is classified as a property settlement under I.R.C. § 1041(a). The
transferor (employee) spouse and not the recipient is taxed on the income. See Ficchi v. Commis-
sioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1986-191; Ltr. Rul. 8531042. After the effective date of the Act, the pension is
taxable to the recipient of the payments.
82 See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B). Abie must avoid agreeing to pay Becky's future tax. Such payment
may produce income under I.R.C. § 61. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716
(1929) (employer's payment of tax on salaries is taxable income to employee); Rev. Rul. 71-498,
1971-2 C.B. 434 (replaced the complex algebraic formulas formerly used). See also Mahana v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. C1.) (payment of wife's tax in guaranteed trust yield held alimony), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 978 (1950); Neeman v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 397 (1949), aft'd, 200 F.2d 560 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 956 (1953). The agreement may provide that the $400 is a transfer
of cash based upon a hypothetical gain recognition to effect an equal distribution of the net value of
the property. A statement containing a specific figure should not run afoul of the Old Colony case.
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consistently to property transfers between spouses. The effect of the
blanket application of section 1041 on a sale of property is startling. For
example, Abie sells Becky his old samovar for its fair market value of
$1,000. Abie bought the samovar at The Green Dragon market for $10.
Under ordinary circumstances, Becky's basis in the samovar is $1,0008 3
and Abie's gain in the transaction is $990.84 Section 1041 does not treat
this as an ordinary arm's length transaction because Becky is married to
Abie.8 5 Becky's inherits the transferor's basis of $10,86 even though the
amount Becky paid in cash far exceeds the basis.8 7 Abie does not recog-
nize a gain on this sale because section 1041 controls all property trans-
fers between spouses.88
On the other hand, a sale between Becky and a corporation wholly
owned by Abie, will not trigger section 1041.89 In this case the sale is not
literally between spouses, but between an individual and a corporation or
between two corporations. 90 These examples, or rather tax planning op-
portunities, based on the temporary regulations interpreting section
1041, suggest that the application of section 1041 may eventually be-
come elective for taxpayers able to funnel their interspousal transfers
through corporations. Hence, the tax treatment of divorced taxpayers
will be inconsistent. Although the problem is relatively narrow, the mix
of options available will seriously undermine the Congressional effort to
make the taxation of property settlements consistent and predictable.9 1
Assuming that nonrecognition should apply to business transfers, it is
necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, the application of
the nonrecognition provisions can be defeated through use of the simple
device of a wholly owned or family owned corporation or other entity. If
one spouse were permitted to transfer property in a taxable transaction
to a corporation controlled by the other, the married couple could keep
their property, and at the same time increase the basis of the property to
gain depreciation allowances or other benefits between themselves. 92
83 I.R.C. § 1012.
84 I.R.C. § 1001(a).
85 I.R.C. § 1041(a).
86 I.R.C. § 1041(b).
87 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), A-11 (1984).
88 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(a), A-2 (1984). Section 1041 contains no exceptions for
business transfers between spouses. Instead of the above example, suppose that Becky were an
antique dealer, Abie an interior decorator, and the transfer occurred in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. The result is the same. See id. at ex. 2. If the samovar were part of his inventory, Abie could
deduct his cost ($10) from the cost of goods sold because title passed to Becky. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.471-1 (1960). Because § 1041 applies, however, Abie would not count the $1,000 in cash as
sales income. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1041-IT(a), A-2 & 1.1041-IT(d), A-11 (1984).
89 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a), A-2 ex. 3 (1984).
90 Id.
91 The determination of whether the sale was made by the individual spouse or his or her con-
trolled corporation will raise difficult factual issues reminiscent of the Court Holding Company Doc-
trine. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Company, 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (corporate distribution of
asset to shareholders after negotiation of sale by corporation, but prior to formal transfer, ineffective
for tax purposes); but see United States v. Cumberland Public Service Company, 338 U.S. 451 (1950)
(step-transaction doctrine not applied, sale held made by shareholders).
92 The 1986 Act reduced the amount of the tax benefits available under the 1984 Act. The value
of the deduction, nevertheless, is directly related to the basis of the property. See H.R. 3838 Tit. II,
Sec. 201 (modification of ACRS, I.R.C. § 168), Sec. 211 (repeal of investment tax credit, I.R.C.
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Prior to the effective date of the 1986 Act, the gain recognition in the
case of a wholly-owned or 80% owned corporation will bear a high cost.
Section 1239 converts all gain to ordinary income on the transfer of an
asset depreciable in the hands of the recipient which is transferred be-
tween related parties such as Becky and Abie's 80% owned corpora-
tion. 93 If the asset is not depreciable under section 167, or if Abie only
owns 79% of the corporation, section 1239 does not apply.94 Under the
1986 Act, there is little practical difference between capital gain income
and ordinary income.
III. The Section 1041 Tax Shelter
A. The Tax Free Transfer of Assets With Undesirable Tax Charateristics
Pursuant to section 1041, the assignment of tax consequences be-
tween Abie and Becky occurs automatically because the recipient takes
the transferor's basis and prior tax history in the property. If both
spouses own property, marriage and divorce, and to a lesser extent mar-
riage alone, may become the ultimate tax shelter. For example, assume
Becky owns highly appreciated property, a prize Hampshire, basis $10
and fair market value of $100. Abie owns a Perigord worth $100 with a
basis of $100. Upon divorce Abie and Becky trade pigs. Becky's poten-
tial gain of $90 is reduced to zero. 95 She gets a $100 pig and freedom
from taxes on the $90 profit she made on her $10 pig. Becky's basis and
her potential gain of $90 attaches to the pig like a latent defect. Initially
neither transfer is taxable under section 1041. But on a later sale, Abie
will recognize a gain of $90 because Becky transferred her tax liability
along with her pig.96
Compare the foregoing tax results under section 1041 to other non-
recognition transactions in which assignment of income is prevented be-
cause the transferor of the property keeps a relatively constant basis, 97
and hence, an equally constant potential gain or loss throughout the
chain of nonrecognition transactions.9" Assume in the above transaction
§ 46), Sec. 221 (reduction of general business credit, I.R.C. § 38(c)(1)(B)) & Sec. 241 (repeal of five
year amortization of trade marks, I.R.C. § 177).
93 I.R.C. § 1239(a). I.R.C. § 1239 does not apply to assets which are not depreciable under
I.R.C. § 167. Graham v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 853 (1981) (secret formula for liquid paper not
depreciable).
94 Id. The 1986 Act repealed the preference for long term capital gain income provided by
I.R.C. § 1202. See HR 3838 Tit. III(A), Sec. 301.
95 See I.R.C. § 1041(b); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), A-I1 (1984).
96 See I.R.C. § 1041(a).
97 Compare I.R.C. § 1031 (carryover basis) with I.R.C. § 362 (substituted basis) and I.R.C. § 358
(carryover basis). In the latter case, for example, the transferor of Blackacre (basis $25) to a wholly
owned corporation in exchange for corporate stock in a transaction qualifying for non-recognition
treatment under I.R.C. § 351 takes a carryover basis in the stock equal to the transferor's basis in
Blackacre ($25). The corporation takes a substituted basis in Blackacre equal to its transferor's for-
mer basis ($25). Although a corporation has a zero basis in its own stock, the substituted basis rule
avoids the zero basis problem. See Rev. Rul. 74-503, 1974-2 C.B. 117. See also I.R.C. § 1032 (corpo-
ration recognizes no gain on exchange of its stock for property).
98 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (basis of property received in nonrecognition transfer to corpora-
tion); I.R.C. § 1031(d) (basis of nonrecognition property same as like-kind property exchanged). See
also I.R.C. § 1033(b) (adjusted basis same as property converted).
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the nonrecognition rules of section 1031 apply.9 9 Here the immediate
recognition of gain by Becky is deferred as above.10 0 However, Becky
substitutes her historic $10 basis in the new pig. 0 1 Thus, if Becky sells
the pig for $100, she recognizes a gain of $90. Abie, likewise, keeps his
original basis of $100, and on the subsequent sale of his new Hampshire
for $100, does not recognize a gain or a loss. 10 2
The effect of the carryover basis rules is to shift the tax burden of
appreciation inherent in the transferred asset from the transferor to the
recipient. 10 3 This is similar to the tax result which occurs in a gift trans-
fer under section 1015. If the movement is all in one direction, that is
only one spouse transfers property, the carryover basis principle of sec-
tion 1041 is analogous to the gift tax basis. If each spouse transfers
property to the other, however, the carryover basis is not appropriate.
Transactions that are exchanges of property are more clearly analogous
to a sale, not to a gift. Ordinary folks call it "bartering," not "giving." 104
Further, since section 1041 applies to unequal property divisions, the
statute permits an outright sale of tax consequences. The limit, of
course, is that the parties to the transaction marry first.
B. Transfer of Property Subject to Liability in Excess of Basis
While overruling the Davis case, Congress dislodged a few other tax
principles as well. For example, to effect an equal division of property in
the divorce, Abie borrows $50 from National Bank, pledging the pig as
collateral for the loan.' 0 5 Abie then transfers the pig to Becky subject to
the $50 debt. 10 6 The relief from the obligation to repay a loan is ordina-
rily treated as the equivalent of a cash receipt.' 0 7 Abie's basis would
thereby be reduced by the amount of the cost recovered in the ex-
change. l0 8 Because the amount of the liability exceeded Abie's basis,
99 See I.R.C. § 1031(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(e)-I (1971) (I.R.C. § 1031 not applicable to live-
stock of different sexes). Pigs used as breeding stock are eligible for the investment tax credit.
I.R.C. §§ 38 & 47(e) (transfers between spouses of § 38 property under I.R.C. § 1041 do not trigger
recapture); I.R.C. § 48(a)(6) (livestock is § 38 property).
100 Compare I.R.C. § 1031(a) with I.R.C. § 1041(a).
101 Compare I.R.C. § 1031(d) with I.R.C. § 1041(b).
102 Id. If § 1031 did not apply to the exchange, Becky would recognize a gain of $90 and Abie
would recognize no gain. See I.R.C. § 1001.
103 Davis, 370 U.S. at 67-69. In the ideal situation, Abie and Becky each have separate property.
Abie owns 100 shares of A., Inc., which has a basis of $10 and a fair market value of $100. Becky
owns 100 shares of B., Inc., which has a basis of $75 and a fair market value of $100. Incident to the
divorce, Becky transfers 50 shares of B stock to Abie, and Abie transfers 50 shares of A stock to
Becky. Under § 1041(a), neither Abie nor Becky will recognize gain and each will own 100 shares of
stock with a combined basis of $42.50. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2). Here both the assets and bases of prop-
erty owned prior to the property settlement are equally divided. But this outcome for Abie and
Becky is coincidental and unusual.
104 But see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.1041-1T(d), A-1i (1984) (a "bona fide sale" called a gift).
105 Again, assume that only Abie's property (his pig which has a fair market value of $100 and a
basis of $1) will be transferred and cannot conveniently be divided.
106 See I.R.C. § 1239(c). Section 1239 does not apply to transfers between husband and wife. A
transfer between Abie and Becky occurring before marriage in which gain is recognized will permit a
step up in basis and its tax deduction benefits to be achieved without penalty. See also I.R.C.
§ 1041(d) (non-resident alien).
107 See generally Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
108 Becky's basis is $1. See I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2) (derived from Abie's former basis). The $50 does
not raise Becky's basis. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), A-12 (1984).
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one expects Abie to recognize gain. 10 9 In the case of an ordinary gift, the
gain is limited to the excess of the liability over Abie's basis. 10 Thus $49
of Abie's potential $99 gain would be recognized."1 ' The donee of the
gift would increase the basis to the amount of the liability, here $50.112
In divorce transfers, however, the recognition of Abie's gain for tax pur-
poses is not only deferred, it is transferred to Becky.' 1 3 If the price of the
pig fell below $50 and the bank foreclosed its lien, Becky will realize and
recognize a gain of $49 for tax purposes. 114 Notice that in this case she
actually suffers a financial loss while Abie received the proceeds of the
loan tax free. 1 5 Hence, section 1041 enables the tax-free division of
mortgaged property following divorce 16 and coincidently allows the
transferor to bail out cash and leave his or her spouse with both the lia-
bility to repay the loan and the tax bill. 117
Section 1041 is potentially useful to avoid gain recognition for the
owner of a garden variety tax shelter, where the fair market value is less
than the mortgage to which it is subject. Should the mortgagor fore-
close, Becky would recognize gain equal to the difference between the
liability, which is treated as her amount realized, and her basis. 118 If
Becky transfers the property to Abie prior to the foreclosure, Becky's
inchoate gain will be recognized on the bank's foreclosure, with one im-
portant difference. Abie, not Becky, will realize and recognize the
gain. 119
The nonrecognition section has the potential for tax abuse that is
not balanced against the economic needs of a divorcing couple. In the
case where the liability exceeds the basis of the property transferred, a
limited deferral of the potential tax liability through the use of install-
109 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 4 (1947); see Technical Memorandum, supra note 15, at
10; H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983); Estate ofLevine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1980); Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aft'd, 455 F.2d 502
(5th Cir. 1972); see also Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 192 (1982).
110 Id.
Ill Id.
112 Id. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1015-4(a)(1) (1972) & 1.1015-5(a) (1983). See also I.R.C. § 1041(a);
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), A-12 (1984) (property transferred subject to liabilities).
113 Becky's basis is not increased by the liability she assumed. See id. at A-11. Under the 1986
Act, the recipient's ability to deduct interest is severly limited. For example, in the case of passive
investment property, such as real estate, expenses are deductible up to the amount of income from
the investment. Hence, if the property does not produce income, no expenses are deductible. See
H.R. 3838 Tit. V, Sec. 501 (limits losses on passive activities) & Sec. 511 (limits non-business interest
deductions, I.R.C. § 163(d)).
114 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
115 Id. at 309.
116 H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983).
117 The 1984 Act did not distinguish outright transfers to a spouse from transfers to a trust for
the benefit of a spouse. The 1986 Act makes I.R.C. § 1041 inapplicable to transfers of property in
trust where the property is subject to liability in excess of basis and the transfer of installment obliga-
tions in trust. See H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, §§ 421(b) & (c) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(e)(1)). The
1986 Act permits a step up in basis equal to the gain recognized by the transferor, which may be of
more benefit to the transferor than nonrecognition. Id. at § 421(b) (adding I.R.C. § 1041 (b)(2)). See
supra note 92.
118 Cf Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 284 U.S.
1 (1931).
119 I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
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ment reporting appears a more reasonable solution. 120 The 1986 Act
has slightly limited the abuse by exempting transfers of property subject
to liability in excess of basis in trust. 12 1 Direct transfers, however, are not
affected. 122
Suppose again that Abie transfers an asset whose liability exceeds
basis, but this time the transfer is in trust, income to Becky for life, re-
mainder to a related third party. Under the 1986 Act, section 1041 is
inapplicable to transfers in trust of installment obligations 23 or assets,
subject to a liabilty in excess of basis.124 The amendment causes the im-
mediate recognition of gain upon the transfer of property in the course
of a divorce, the very thing section 1041 was to prevent. 25 Because sec-
120 Compare I.R.C §§ 357 & 453 with I.R.C. § 1041(a).
121 The 1986 Act modified § 1041(a). See H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII Sec. 1842, § 421(b) (adds
§§ 1041(e)) & 421(c) (adds I.R.C. § 453B(g)).
122 Transfer of property on behalf of one spouse to third parties will not escape taxation. For
example, Abie agrees in writing to transfer his red Packard convertible, which is worth $40,000 and
has a basis of $10,000, to Becky's attorney to cover Becky's legal fees. The property transfer to the
attorney is treated as two transfers. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), A-9 (1984). One transfer is
a gift from Abie to Becky and another simultaneous transfer is from Becky to her attorney. I.R.C.
§ 1041(a). Becky will recognize gain or loss pursuant to I.R.C. § 1001 with her basis derived from
Abie. I.R.C. § 1041(b). Only the first transfer is made to a spouse and thus covered by § 1041.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c), A-9 (1984) (third party transfers). Hence, Abie recognizes no
gain or loss on the transfer, but Becky recognizes a gain of $30,000 on the transfer of appreciated
property to satisfy a debt. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 66. Becky's payment is generally not deductible. See
Fleishman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 439 (1966) (defending suit to set aside antenuptial agreement
not deductible); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (defending against wife's claim to
community property not deductible); but see Ruth R. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964) (fee to gain alimony is
deductible). Suppose instead Abie transfers his red convertible to Becky's mother as a gift. Abie
recognizes no gain or loss upon the transfer. Becky recognizes no gain or loss. I.R.C. § 1041(a).
Becky is liable for gift tax, if any. For purposes of calculating gain, the basis of mother's new red
convertible is Becky's basis, adjusted for the portion of gift tax attributed to the appreciation of the
property, which is zero. I.R.C. § 1015(d). Here Becky's basis is Abie's basis immediately before
transfer. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2). Thus, the use of appreciated property rather than cash allowed Abie
to fulfull his obligation to pay Becky's attorney and at the same time shifted the tax burden of the
gain on property to Becky. A cash payment to Becky's attorney may qualify as alimony. I.R.C.
§ 71(b)(1)(A) (payment must be pursuant to written divorce instrument).
Even an asset with desirable tax consequences may cause unfair tax results for one spouse.
Assume that Abie and Becky's major asset is their highly appreciated family home. If the house is
sold to a third party, the Code provides relief from the inclusion of gain on such a sale. Rev. Rul. 74-
250, 1974-1 C.B. 202 (nonrecognition applied separately where husband and wife separated on the
sale of family home and each purchased replacement homes within statutory period). Suppose, how-
ever, that Becky moves out, they delay the sale, but continue to own the house for five years, at which
time it will be sold to a third party and the proceeds evenly divided. In the latter case, each will
recognize an equal amount of gain, but their potential tax liabilty might not be equal. Abie will be
able to defer gain recognition by purchasing another residence within two years. See I.R.C. § 1034;
see also I.R.C. § 121 (nonrecognition of $125,000 gain for taxpayers over 55). For Becky, however,
tax relief is no longer available. At the time of the sale in the fifth year, the house is no longer
Becky's residence and neither I.R.C. § 121 nor § 1034 apply. See Young v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 1002 (1985). But see Bolaris v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1985) (I.R.C.
§ 1034 applied in the case of a temporary rental of an old residence until sold; depreciation deduc-
tion also allowed). The problem in a divorce case is that the spouse who moves out has abandoned
the residence. Payment of the mortgage or use of the house by the taxpayer's children does not
meet the requirements of residence under Young.
123 See I.R.C. § 453B(g) (added by H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, § 421(c)).
124 See I.R.C. § 1041(e) (liability in excess of basis) added by H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842,
§ 421 (b)).
125 The nonrecognition issue hinges on whether Davis applies to the transfer. For example, the
transfer of community property or the retention of an interest by the grantor will invoke the pre-
1984 nonrecognition rules. See infra note 167. The amendment to the 1986 Act was in response to a
suggestion that such a transfer avoids taxing either spouse under the 1984 Act. See Ginsberg, State-
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tion 1041 is not limited to divorce, this amendment permits the happily
married taxpayer to a gain a step up in basis without losing control of his
or her property. Clearly, this is an unreasonable policy.
C. Recapture of Investment Credits and Accelerated Cost Recovery
Although under section 1041 the property settlement itself does not
trigger tax liability for the transferor of property, 126 the transfer of prop-
erty eligible for the investment tax credit may carry immediate tax conse-
quences for the recipient. 127 Tacoma Slew, Abie's famous breeding pig,
qualifies for the investment tax credit when used in Abie's business. As-
sume, Abie's cost for Tacoma Slew was $10,000. Using the ACRS
method, Abie depreciated the property in years one and two by $2,500
and $3,800, respectively, and in addition, claimed an investment credit of
$400 in year one.' 28 In year three, when Abie transfers the pig to Becky,
who keeps it as a family pet, it has an adjusted basis of $3,700129 and a
fair market value of $10,000. As a family pet, however, it no longer qual-
ifies under the investment credit provisions.' 30 The amount Abie de-
ducted two years ago as investment credit, $134, is recaptured. The
change of use causes Becky, as the owner of the property at the time the
property was no longer qualified, to increase her tax by an amount equal
to Abie's former tax credit.' 3 ' Had Becky's use of Tacoma Slew quali-
fied, the investment credit recapture would not apply. 132
Ordinarily, the seller of certain investment property or property
used in business may recognize ordinary income in the form of deprecia-
ment Before the Senate Finance Committee on S. 814, June 5, 1985. In this example, according to
Professor Martin D. Ginsberg's interpretation of I.R.C. § 104 1(a), when the bank forecloses on the
pig, the gain is recognized as in the case of the direct transfer. It is the trust, however, the legal
owner of the property, which recognizes the gain. Neither Abie, who is no longer the owner of the
property, nor Becky, the income beneficiary, is liable for the payment of the tax. Since the pig is the
trust's only asset, the tax liability would be uncollectable. Professor Ginsberg noted that a similar
shift of tax liability to a trust would occur in the case of a transfer of an installment obligation to a
trust. Id.
The nonrecognition provision of§ 1041 specifically includes a transfer in trust where the spouse
is a beneficiary and a third party is the remainder person of the trust. According to Professor
Thomas R. White III, however, the application of § 1041 to a transfer in trust is unclear. Professor
White argues that the nonrecognition afforded by § 1041 is limited to the recipient spouse's portion
of the transfer and should not extend to the remainder interest. See White, Memorandum to the
Honorable Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, November 12, 1985.
Under this interpretation and in view of I.R.C. § 100 1(e) (zero basis allocated to income beneficiary),
the 1986 Act would not change the effect of § 1041 on trusts.
The 1986 amendments do not clarify the scope of§ 1041, which may allow the transfer of other
tax attributes to third parties via § 1041 and a transfer in trust for the benefit of a spouse, remainder
to third parties.
126 The investment tax credit was repealed by the 1986 Act. H.R. 3838 Tit. IIB, Sec. 211. The
recapture provisions, however, are still applicable.
127 I.R.C. § 47.
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(1)(1) (1983) (pigs eligible for investment tax credit).
129 See I.R.C. § 47(e) (transfers between spouses of § 38 property under I.R.C. § 1041 do not
trigger recapture) & § 48(a)(6) (livestock § 38 property).
130 I.R.C. § 38.
131 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), A-13 (1984) (investment tax credit recapture).
132 Id. Under the 1986 Act, the investment tax credit is not available to Becky. Congress re-
pealed the investment tax credit for property placed in service in 1987. Carryover credits are re-
duced by 17.57 in 1986 and 35% in 1988. See H.R. 3838 Tit II(B), Sec, 211.
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tion recapture.' 33 This unattractive tax consequence can be avoided
under section 1041. Abie can transfer property that has been depreci-
ated 34 under accelerated methods of cost recovery' 3 5 to Becky.136 Re-
capture of ordinary income will not occur on Abie's transfer.' 37 Becky's
resale of the transferred property will trigger the recapture sections 38
and Becky will recognize ordinary income.' 39 As in the case of the invest-
ment credit, the benefit of the depreciation deductions is enjoyed by the
transferor of the property. Hence, Becky takes Tacoma Slew's lower ad-
justed basis and the liability for the amount of gain subject to recapture
of accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit. 40
One may suppose that Abie's lawyer won't leave him holding Becky's
property and her tax liability. Even though the temporary regulations
state Becky "must supply" Abie with "sufficient" documentation of her
adjusted basis, holding period, and liability for the recapture of the in-
vestment credit, the glitch in the carryover basis rule is the absence of a
procedure to enforce Becky's record keeping obligation.' 4 ' The 1041
regulations state that the required information need not be supplied un-
til the date of the transfer. 142 A procedure to permit either spouse to
obtain records concerning the property to be transferred in a property
division has not been devised. 143 Thus, even if the records are volunta-
133 I.R.C. § 1245 (depredation recapture).
134 Whether the depredation deduction was allowed solely to Abie on a separate return or to
Abie and Becky on ajoint return does not affect the application of I.R.C. § 1041(a) (nonrecognition
of gain on transfer to former spouse).
135 I.R.C. § 168. The 1986 Act amended the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) for prop-
erty placed in service after December 31, 1986. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II
38-40 (1986) (Statement of Managers).
136 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 291 (corporate preference items); 1245 (depredable personal property);
1250 (depredable real property); 1254(a) (deductible costs of oil, gas, and geothermal property).
The 1986 Act does not alter signficantly the recapture provisions. The Act does, however, limit
losses from passive activities. See H.R. 3838 Tit. V., Sec. 501.
137 Id. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), A-13 (1984).
138 I.R.C. § 1245. The 1986 Act repeals the preferential tax treatment for long term capital gains
income for individuals, but retains the distinction between ordinary and capital income. This struc-
ture will permit reinstatement of the preference for capital gains in the future. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-107 (1986) (Statement of Managers).
139 Id. The investment credit is also recaptured. See I.R.C. § 38; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-
IT(d), A-13 (1984).
140 The rule would also apply in the case where Abie acquired the property and elected the in-
vestment credit and an accelerated method of cost recovery prior to his marriage to Becky. I.R.C.
§ 453(i)(2) (installment recapture). Recapture will be a greater burden if Abie makes installment
payments. After 1984, all recapture of ordinary income is recognized in the year of the transfer.
The 1986 Act modifies this result. The Act makes § 1041 inapplicable to the transfer of installment
obligations to a trust for the benefit of a spouse. H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, § 421(c) (adding
I.R.C. § 453B(g)). See also supra note 138.
141 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), A-14 (1984) (record keeping requirements). Under a re-
cent District Court decision, Olsen v. Commissioner, 54 A.F.T.R.2d 84-6217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Abie
cannot obtain Becky's prior tax returns from the Service to prepare his own tax return, nor force
Becky to supply him with copies of the returns under the Code's procedure rule. Id. at 84-6218;
I.R.C. § 6103(c).
142 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(e), A-14 (1984).
143 A good faith requirement in the determination of a property settlement has occasionally been
imposed by the courts. See Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1984); White v. United
States, 550 F. Supp. 96, 100 (M.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 740 F.2d 836 (11th Cir.
1984); Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 747 n.6 (1978) (spouses claiming one position in state
divorce court not permitted to change theory in federal tax court). Cf Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 164 N.E. 545 (1929):
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rily made available in time for Abie to prepare his tax return, the date of
the transfer is too late for Abie to make a reasonable valuation of the
proffered property. 144
IV. Property Settlement Taxed As Alimony
Under prior law, a cash payment in satisfaction of spousal property
rights theoretically was not deductible as alimony by the payor. 145 Prop-
erty rights under state law, rather than the form of the payment, 146 deter-
mined the tax result. 147 A payment contingent on Becky's survival was
not deductible if the payment equalled the value of her interest in marital
or community property. 48 The test of alimony was not simply the dis-
tinction between cash and property, 49 but the substance of the trans-
fer.150 Only where the transfer was to satisfy the husband's obligation of
[C]opartners, owe to one another... the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct,
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior.
Id. at 463-64 [emphasis in original].
The federal tax courts have not held former spouses to the morals of the market place. See
generally U.C.C. § 1-203 (1984) (commercial contracts require good faith, honesty in fact).
144 The risk of latent tax liability originating through Becky's fault or mistake is placed on Abie.
Abie may receive some protection from a warranty by Becky of the tax history of the property trans-
ferred. Discovery through state rules of procedure will not fully inform the recipient of a latent
liability. For example, if Becky owns depreciable property but failed to take the allowable deprecia-
tion deduction, the basis of the property is reduced by the allowable amount of depredation, a
minimum basis reduction based upon what could have been deducted by taxpayer even if the tax-
payer literally could not benefit from the deduction. See I.R.C. § 1016(a).
145 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Star. 798 (1984) (repealed by I.R.C. § 71(a) (required alimony pay-
ments be for support of the former spouse); Fowler v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 941 (1985);
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(l)(i) (1957). See Porter v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968). But
see Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976); Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
451, 460-61 (1980), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2 (general property rights did not support taxpayer's claim
that receipt was property settlement and not alimony).
146 See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3) (gain from sale of property included in gross income) & 1001(a) (recog-
nition of gain).
147 But see Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924 (1960) (character of payment determined by sur-
rounding facts and circumstances). See Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976); Bard-
well v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451
(1980), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2 (periodic payments of "property settlement" taxed as alimony).
148 See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357, 1367-68 (1980); Hayutin v. Commissioner,
508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974); Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1.
But see Riddell v. Guggenhein, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960) (payments for share of community prop-
erty not alimony); Fowler v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 941 (1985) (temporary support taken
into account in computing division of community property not alimony); Goninen v. Commissioner,
47 T.C.M. (CCH) 737 (1983); Dorn v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1545 (1983) (noncontingent
payments not to exceed 10 years not treated as alimony); Wells-Lee v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1217 (1966) (payment designated as alimony by the state court nonetheless taxed as property
settlement). Cf. Mivec v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 24 (1981).
149 Prior to 1984, either cash or property qualified as alimony. See I.R.C. § 71 (a) (1982); cf. I.R.C.
§ 61 & Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1954) (gross income does not depend on form of receipt); Rice v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 752 (1985) (Davis applied to transfer of securities to satisfy alimony pay-
ments). But see Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1976) (form is a factor distin-
guishing property settlement from alimony payments).
150 See Oman v. Commissioner, 767 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1985) (lump sum alimony paid over nine
years not taxed as alimony); Biddle v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1361 (1979); Bolza v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138 (1981); Pierce v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1977).
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support under state law was the transfer treated as alimony. 151 The revi-
sion of section 71 changes this result. 152 The stated purpose of the re-
vised definition of alimony is to make the application of alimony rules
uniform and automatic, 153 and not dependent on state matrimonial laws.
The definition also prevents the deduction of large, one-time lump sum
property settlements.154 Thus, large property settlements paid in install-
ments or small property settlements paid in a lump sum are fully
deductible. 55
Suppose in the property settlement Becky transferred depreciated
property (adjusted basis $100,000, fair market value $15,000) in ex-
change for $15,000 cash from Abie. Becky cannot recognize a loss under
section 1041.156 Her basis becomes Abie's basis. 157 To add to Becky's
151- See Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Widmer v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. 405 (1980); Newbury v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 690 (1966). Cf. White v. Commissioner, 770
F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1985), rev' 82 T.C. 222 (1984) ("We cannot change the tax laws to allocate the
tax burden as the parties may have contemplated."); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S.
252, 255 (1939) ("In the field of taxation .... written documents are not rigidly binding."). Courts
have refused to determine tax issues on the mere form or labels given by the parties to the transac-
tion at issue. See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357, 1368 (1980) (payment labeled "sup-
port" held property division); Weiner v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 155 (1973); Broida v. United States,
40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) No. 77-5189 (N.D. Ohio, 1977);Jackson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 125, 129-30
(1970).
152 Compare I.R.C. § 71(b) with I.R.C § 71(a) (1982) (support requirement) (repealed by Pub. L. No.
98-369, 98 Stat. 795 (1984)); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(a), A-3 (1984) (support not an ele-
ment of alimony); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983).
153 H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 194 (1983).
154 See id.
155 See I.R.C. § 71(0. Under the 1986 Act, Abie can deduct a lump sum cash payment made
pursuant to an alimony agreement, for example $200,000, in one year. Becky has $200,000 in ordi-
nary alimony income. Assuming no further payments, neither one has income or a deduction in the
second year. In the third year, Abie recaptures $185,000 of his excess alimony; Becky has a corre-
sponding deduction. Since the rates for 1986 are considerably higher than those in 1988, Congress
has given Abie yet another tax advantage. As under the 1984 Act, Abie can fully deduct the cash
settlement if spread over the statutory minimum period for alimony. Here again Congress liberal-
ized the deduction by cutting the period from six years, required in 1984, to three years after 1986.
See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (amending I.R.C. § 71(f) (three year time period is retro-
active to the effective date of the 1984 Act).
The 1986 Act amends I.R.C. § 71(f) to make alimony treatment easier to obtain than under the
1984 Act. The alimony trust may increase Abie's tax benefit. Under current law, a property settle-
ment paid through a trust is generally more advantageous to the transferor than the direct cash
payment of a property settlement. The advantage stems from the revised trust provisions which
permit the shifting of income between former spouses without meeting the requirements for alimony
under I.R.C. § 7 1. Payments which decrease by more than $15,000 per year in the first three years of
payment are subject to recapture by the payor. Id. The penalties for front loading installment pay-
ments in § 71 do not affect § 682. The transfer of an income interest in trust to a former spouse is
treated as a property settlement. The transferor spouse recognizes no gain or loss, and the recipient
spouse is treated as the beneficiary of an ordinary trust. In effect, trust payments are taxed as if the
property were transferred directly to the recipient. I.R.C. § 682(b). Of course, by using a trust, Abie
can keep control of the property during the period of the trust and keep a reversionary interest.
Under the 1986 Act, the nonrecognition provisions of § 1041(a) are inapplicable to the transfer
of property in trust where the transferred property is subject to a liability in excess of basis and the
transfer of property subject to an installment obligation. H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842 §§ 421(b)
& (c). Under the Code prior to the 1984 Act the payments from trusts created to satisfy divorce
settlements were taxed as alimony to the recipient (I.R.C. § 71(d) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No.
98-369, 98 Stat. 795 (1984)).
156 I.R.C. § 1041(a). The 1986 Act modifies I.R.C. §§ 267(a), (b)(1), and (c)(4) to allow losses
between spouses on transfers before the divorce is final. H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842, § 421(a)
(adds I.R.C. § 267(g)).
157 I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2) (property retains pre-divorce basis).
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woe, under section 71 the $15,000 payment for the property can be
structured as alimony.' 58 Section 1041 does not take precedence over
section 71 and both sections are applicable to the transfer. x59 Thus, if
the agreement is drafted to comply with section 71,160 Abie has a double
windfall. Assuming a constant $15,000 market value, Abie can recognize
loss on his later disposition of the property' 6' and with proper drafting
he can fully deduct his $15,000 cost as alimony 62 under section 215.163
V. Exceptions to Section 1041
A. Antenuptial Transfers
While generally denying gain recognition and a stepped up basis in
marital transfers, Congress left a small hole. Transfers made prior to
marriage pursuant to an antenuptial agreement are not within section
1041.164 Hence, if Abie transfers appreciated property to his future wife
in exchange for her release of future marital rights, Abie recognizes gain
and his future wife has a step up in basis.' 65 The higher basis will sup-
port increased depreciation deductions indirectly available to Abie if he
and his future wife file a joint return.1 66 Because avoiding section 1041
can be accomplished through forethought and early planning, many
Porsche owners seeking a significant relationship would not set foot in
McGlade's Pub without a tax advisor in tow. 167
158 See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(a), A-3 (1984). Payments need not be periodic. Id.
Under current law alimony requirements are explicitly formal. However, similar results occurred
under prior law. See Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976); Bardwell v. Commis-
sioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451 (1980) (periodic
payments of "property settlement" taxed as alimony), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2
159 I.R.C. § 1041 regulates the transfer of property. I.R.C. § 71 determines whether the cash
payment qualifies as alimony. The sections are not mutually exclusive.
160 See generally I.R.C. § 71(b).
161 See I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
162 See I.R.C. § 71.
163 I.R.C. § 215(1). But see I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B) (nonalimony treatment elections); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), A-8 (1984); I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2). With tax advice, Becky can avoid alimony treat-
ment by having a written agreement stating that the cash payments that otherwise qualify as alimony
shall not be deducted by Abie nor included in Becky's income. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1). A copy of the
agreement must be attached to Becky's tax return for each year to which the non-alimony designa-
tion applies. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), A-8 (1984). See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1). Becky can insist on
payment in diamonds.
164 See generally I.R.C. § 1041 (only property transferred during marriage or after divorce is within
the scope of this section); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a), A-5 (1984) (property acquired after
divorce is § 1041 property). A division of property between unmarried cohabitants is not covered by
I.R.C. § 1041. The incidence of gain recognition on the transfer of assets, including cash, is unclear.
A transfer of separately owned property is either a gift (see Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278 (1960)) and hence not normally subject to gain recognition or a payment of an obligation with
appreciated property and hence subject to gain recognition. See supra note 73 (recognition of loss is
not premitted in personal transactions). The transfer is not alimony for lack of a divorce or separa-
tion instrument.
The recipient's treatment is more uncertain. There will be no immediate tax consequences if
the receipt is a gift. I.R.C. § 102. But see I.R.C. § 61; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426 (1955) (windfalls are taxable). In contrast, if the receipt is compensation for personal injury, the
transfer is excluded under I.R.C. § 104. But see I.R.C. § 1012 (cost basis).
165 See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Ltr. Rul. 8029001 1980
P-H 142,724.
166 The transfer must be completed before the marriage to avoid the application of I.R.C. § 1041.
167 An equally significant exception to § 1041 which has limited application involves nonresident
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B. Transfer Of An Income Interest In Trust
Where the subject of the property settlement is the right to receive
all the income from the trust for the life of the grantor, Congress treats
the transfer with a reversionary interest as alimony paid by a trust,1 68 and
the transfer of the entire interest as a property settlement.1 69 For exam-
ple, if Abie transfers his income interest to Becky for five years, the carry-
over basis rules of section 1041 do not apply.170 Becky has a zero basis in
the term interest acquired by gift.' 7 ' Hence, on a taxable disposition of
the term interest, Becky will be taxed on the entire amount received.' 72
On the other hand, if Abie transfers his entire term interest to Becky (the
right to income for the life of the grantor), Becky succeeds to Abie's basis
in the trust. 73 This distinction is in accord with the assignment of in-
come principles applicable to nonmarital transfers. 7 4
C. The Rendering of Services
The temporary regulations state that property transferred in return
aliens. If the reader will erase Becky from the script for a moment and replace her with Katya, a
resident and citizen of Sweden, Abie's transfer of his separately owned jade chess set to Katya will
trigger recognition of gain or loss for Abie under pre-1984 rules. I.R.C § 1041(d); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), A-3 (1984). A nonresident alien normally is not taxed on property transfers.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 894; but see I.R.C. § 895. This exception to § 1041 is aimed at taxing the apprecia-
tion in the transferred property to Abie, the spouse who is subject to United States taxation. I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(3) (gains from dealing in property). Under pre-1984 rules, state law determines whether the
property is separate or co-owned property. The division of co-owned property will not result in the
recognition of gain by Abie and the property will retain its predivorce basis. See Seianni v. Commis-
sioner, 765 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1983); Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973),
aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Walz
v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935); Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1
C.B. 213. The application of the nonrecognition principle is limited to in-kind divisions of property.
See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'dpercuriam, 552 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1977). In such divisions, the recipient spouse has an interest prior to the divorce
transfer. Compare Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973), aft'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1975) (state's highest court held recipient's interest vested prior to divorce) with Wiles v. Com-
missioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) (no state decision on vesting,
Davis followed). Here Abie will recognize gain on the transfer of separate property under the Davis
principle. I.R.C. § 1239(b)(1) (1982) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 798 (1984)) (ordi-
nary gain on transfer of depreciable property to spouse) (exception to § 1041 where recipient non-
resident alien). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), A-3 (1984). See also Davis, 370 U.S. at 70
(satisfaction of an obligation with appreciated property is a taxable event). However, losses will be
allowed only if the transfer occurs after the divorce. See I.R.C. § 267(a) (losses on the sale ofdepreci-
ated property between spouses disallowed); I.R.C. §§ 267(b)(1) & (c)(4); see also I.R.C. § 267(d) (fu-
ture gain by recipient reduced by loss disallowed to transferor); H.R. 3838 Tit. XVIII, Sec. 1842,
§ 421(a).
168 Cf. I.R.C. § 682(b) (receipt from alimony trust taxed under trust accounting rules); cf. H.R.
3838 Tit. XIV, Sec. 1402 (amending I.R.C. § 673) (provision repeals Clifford Trust exception from
grantor trust rules).
169 Cf. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (recipient takes donor's basis in property).
170 I.R.C. § 267(d).
171 I.R.C. § 1001(e)(1). "Term interest" is defined by the Code as "(A) a life interest in property,
(B) an interest in property for a term of years, (C) or an income interest in a trust." I.R.C.
§ 1001(e)(2).
172 I.R.C. § 1001(a) (Becky's basis is zero).
173 I.R.C. §§ 1001(e)(3) (exception for transfer of entire interest) & 1041(b).
174 See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (assignment of entire beneficial interest in trust
effectively to assignee); see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (transfer of annual interest
coupon ineffective to shift donor's income).
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for services is not covered by section 1041.175 There is no doubt that
Congress intended to enact a uniform nonrecognition rule for inter-
spousal transfers. 176 The 1984 legislation treats property transfers be-
tween spouses as transfers within an economic unit, and transfers
between former spouses as the winding up of a marital partnership. The
cash requirements of section 71 make it clear that the transfer of services
does not qualify for alimony treatment. 177 Even under prior law, which
did not limit the form of alimony payment, the doctrine of imputed ali-
mony was rejected. 178 The temporary regulations relating to the transfer
of services, should be clarified by the Service, in order to prevent parties
from obtaining a step up in basis for the transfer between spouses of
appreciated property in exchange for services.
VI. Issues Not Resolved by Section 1041
A. The Transfer of Property In Exchange For a Note
Although double taxation does not appear to have been intended by
the reversal of the Davis case, deferred payments have an uncertain status
under section 1041, which may cause both Abie and Becky to be taxed on
the same gain.
The application of the migratory basis rule 179 becomes more curious
where instead of cash, Abie gives Becky his note for $100,000 in ex-
change for her interest in their jointly owned property. Under prior law,
Becky recognized a gain'80 and Abie had a fair market value basis in the
property that Becky transferred.' 8 ' The tax treatment was similar to her
receipt of cash. Section 1041 now blocks recognition of gain on the
transfer. Becky's basis migrates over to Abie along with Becky's property
rights.
What is not obvious under section 1041 is how to determine Becky's
basis in the note. The Code says simply that the transferee's (Becky's)
basis is the transferor's (Abie's) basis immediately before the trans-
fer.182Unfortunately, this language permits three plausible results.
First, the most reasonable result is to ignore the note for purposes of
section 1041 and treat Becky as if she received cash. One may analyze
the transfer as a simultaneous cash payment by Abie to Becky and loan
from Becky to Abie. This result, however, does not follow from the lit-
eral application of section 1041. Abie is taxed on the entire appreciation
175 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), A-4 (1984). In its present form, the regulation casts some
doubt whether the transfer of accounts receivable related to services by the transferor is "property"
under I.R.C. § 1041(a). In view of the legislative history and the I.R.C. § 71 non-alimony election,
property should include accounts receivable. Cf. I.R.C. § 721 (accounts receivable are property for
purposes of partnership contributions).
176 See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983) (taxation of interspousal transfers
"inappropriate").
177 I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (alimony must be paid in cash).
178 See, e.g., Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1949) (rental value of residence not
alimony).
179 I.R.C. § 1041(b).
180 See Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979).
181 See Gerlach v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 156 (1970); see also Davis, 370 U.S. at 74.
182 I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
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upon his disposition of the assets. The result then is similar to the Davis
case. 18
The second possible tax result is that Abie, as maker of the note, has
a basis of zero.184 This view, consistent with case law determining the
basis of corporations and partnerships in their own paper, leads to a zero
basis for Becky. 185 Becky loses the value of her basis which traveled to
Abie as the recipient of property under section 1041. Initially, it appears
that Becky is taxed on the value of the property transferred, not merely
her gain, and Abie is taxed on the entire appreciation of the property.'8 6
The third possible analysis, analogous to the result in a nonrecogni-
tion transfer of property between a stockholder and his or her corpora-
tion,' 87 sets Abie's basis in the note equal to the basis of the property
received. With this view, Becky's basis boomerangs back to her. Here
too, both Abie and Becky are taxed on the appreciation of the property,
even though there is only one asset. The Davis Court solved the practical
problem that flows from considering marital rights as property by
determing that the basis of marital rights was equal to their fair market
value at the date of disposition. 188 Though theoretically there may have
been a taxable transfer, the gain realized was zero.18 9
The issue of Becky's low basis may be obviated if the amount real-
ized by collecting the face amount of the note is also a nontaxable trans-
fer under section 1041.190 Whether there is a "transfer" is not apparent.
There is no clear authority that Becky's collection of Abie's note is a
"transfer" and therefore regulated by section 1041. On the contrary, the
collection of a note under prior law did not constitute a sale or exchange
for purposes of determining capital gain treatment.
183 See infra notes 191-199 and accompanying text. The note does not meet the cash requirement
of I.R.C. § 71. See Temp. Treas. Req. § 1.71-IT(b) A-5 (1984). See also supra note 155.
184 Davis, 370 U.S. at 65.
185 Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-503, 1974-2 C.B. 117 (a corporation always has zero basis in its own stock);
I.R.C. § 307(b) (1982) (zero basis for certain capital contributions by nonshareholders); Fehrs Fin.
Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
186 See Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir. 1939); cf. Fairbanks v. United
States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939) (redemption of bonds before maturity prior to enactment of I.R.C.
§ 1232).
187 Cf. I.R.C. § 362(a) (property acquired by corporation has basis equal to that of transferor,
increased by amount of gain recognized to transferor on such transfer).
188 See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63; Davis, 370 U.S. at 72, 75 n.7. Cf. I.R.C. § 1031 (carry-
over basis). In the case of the transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for corporate securi-
ties the transferor-stockholder takes a carryover basis in the property equal to the former basis in the
property transferred, while the corporation takes a substituted basis in the property equal to its
transferor's former basis. I.R.C. § 362. Hence, if Becky transferred Blackacre with a basis of SO to
Abie Inc. in exchange for stock of Abie Inc. in a nonrecognition transaction, Becky's basis in her
Abie Inc. stock would be $10. Abie Inc.'s basis in Blackacre would be $10. Although a corporation
has a zero basis in its own stock, the substituted basis rule avoids the zero basis problem. Cf. I.R.C.
§ 1032(a) (corporation recognizes no gain on exchange of its stock for property).
189 Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (Mrs. Davis' tax result).
190 Query, if Becky holds the note to maturity, was there a transfer of property (the note) back to
her former spouse (Abie) which is incident to divorce and hence protected by I.R.C. § 1041? Becky's
tax problems compound if Becky discounts the note to a third party. Here, the entire proceeds
would recognized as gain to Becky. See Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939); Galvin
Hudson, 20 T.C. 734 (1953), aff'd sub nom., Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954)
(settlement ofjudgement debt not sale or exchange).
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Imputed Interest in Deferred Payments of Property Settlements
Abie and Becky agree to a large property settlement. Becky ex-
changes her marital rights for $1,000,000 to be paid in five equal install-
ments. The agreement states flatly the payments are not to be treated as
alimony. 191 From the details of the agreement, it is clear that Becky ex-
pects the payments to be tax-free to her. There are no cases deciding the
issue of whether section 7872, which provides for imputed interest on
interest free or below market interest loans, ought to apply to divorce
agreements. Arguably, a portion of the installment payments made pur-
suant to a separation agreement constitutes imputed interest. However,
the courts and the Service hold that sections 71 and 215 apply exclusively
to divorce and take precedence over the imputed interest rules. Apply-
ing the Davis principle, the Tax Court' 92 and the Third Circuit 9S held
section 483 is not applicable to payments made pursuant to a property
settlement agreement because the inclusion or deduction of such pay-
ments is exclusively determined by the sections of the Code concerning
alimony. Hence, if a payment is not deductible as alimony, it is not de-
ductible as interest.' 94 Although the Tax Court case related to the trans-
fer of marital rights under section 483 of the Code,' 95 the Court did not
distinguish payments according to whether they related to a support obli-
gation, the satisfaction of marital rights, or the purchase of vested owner-
ship rights.' 96 The Service followed the Tax Court holding that any
deduction permitted in a divorce related transfer is governed exclusively
by sections 71 and 215 of the Code. 197
Any other payment, including an imputed interest payment, ought
to be treated as a gift under section 1041. Imputing interest in the case
of certain transfers of vested property rights as opposed to equitable ap-
portionment of other marital rights would make the application of sec-
tions 71 and 1041 uncertain as to taxation of divorce transfers. Even if
one argues that interest is imputed under section 1041, the interest itself
would be a gift. 1 98
191 A transfer of property to a third party, even if incident to divorce, is not covered by I.R.C.
§ 1041; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), A-9 (1984) (third party transfer).
192 I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B) (form controls nonalimony treatment).
193 See Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921 (1980), aff'd, 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1983).
194 See Fox v. United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975).
195 Id. Under the 1986 Act, non-business interest generally is not deductible. See H.R. 3838 Tit.
V, Sec. 511.
196 See Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921 (1980) (marital rights not property under I.R.C.
§ 483), aff'd, 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1983) (property settlement is "property" under state law). See
also Davis, 370 U.S. at 72 (marital rights treated as property equal to value to property received). But
see Gerlach v. United States, 74-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9425 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (distinguished vested rights
such as joint ownership from marital property claim).
197 Rev. Rul 76-146, 1976-1 C.B. 144.
198 See I.R.C. § 1041(b) (l). These issues are easily avoided by labeling all payments between
spouses "nonincludible" to the recipient and "nondeductible" to the payor. See I.R.C.
§ 71(b)(l)(B). Compare Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (fees added to




VII. A Proposal for New Legislation
In contrast to the 1984 and 1986 tax legislation, fairness would dic-
tate that the tax liability follow the division of wealth. Thus, assuming a
fifty-fifty split of assets between former spouses, the tax statute should
also provide a fifty-fifty split of the amount of gain subject to taxation.
The concept of tax neutrality underlies this legislative model. An
amendment to the Code would greatly simplify the process of divorce
taxation. The solution to many of the complications engendered by sec-
tion 1041 is to require that the tax liablity follow the division of marital
property in a marriage or a divorce. Thus, the tax history, character, or
other incidental attributes of property divided between spouses will have
no individual tax significance. Property can be divided without regard to
the tax burden. At the same time this would eliminate the tax planning
opportunities described above, which, from a societal standpoint, are
dearly undesirable.' 9 9 In addition, the current effect of the tax system
on the uninformed taxpayer will diminish. For example, if a couple were
to divide assets of equal value with bases of 10 and 36, each asset would
take on a new mixed basis of 23. If property worth $100 were divided
60:40, the spouse receiving 60 percent of the property would recognize
sixty percent of the gain. Assuming that the provisions permitting non-
taxable cash payments between spouses continue, the real cost to the
spouses can be divided as they wish. The difference under this proposal
is that the Treasury does not underwrite the cost of a property
settlement.
VIII. Conclusion
By focusing on tax relief for the transferor, Congress did not elimi-
nate the root cause of the unfair apportionment of the amount of gain
subject to taxation on property transferred in a property settlement.
Congress changed the recognition principle which controls to whom the
gain or loss will be taxed. Thus, the tax burden is shifted from the trans-
feror to the recipient of property. The fairness of the tax consequences,
however, depends upon whether the subsequent disposition of the prop-
erty will produce gain or loss. The gain or loss is determined by the
relative bases of the property which is to be divided by the couple. This
in turn determines how the gain and the tax burden will be divided. The
latter determination was not at issue in the Davis case. To simply reverse
Davis by statute does not resolve the problem.
In order to apportion tax liability in proportion to the spouse's share
of assets, one must determine the taxation of property settlement and
alimony by a single standard. The shifting of tax liability to defeat the
apportionment system must be prevented by limiting the recognition of
gains and losses to the proportion of property received in the settlement.
Additionally, the tax accounting rules should be modified to provide in-
199 This proposal would also address the extreme case where a person owning appreciated prop-
erty seeks to avoid gain recognition by marrying and divorcing the prospective buyer. The transfer
may, however, in any event, be vulnerable to attack as a sham transaction. See Boyter v. Commis-
sioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). Cf. Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933).
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stallment recognition of large gain or loss bunched in one taxable year.
Such a system of tax apportionment is neutral because neither party is
favored and because the property division will not produce unusual gain
or loss for the divorced taxpayer.
By enacting section 1041, Congress simply moved the time when
gain would be recognized from the date of the transfer of the property
on divorce to the date of a later resale by the recipient spouse. On pa-
per, the problem appears solved. But section 1041 is merely the reverse
of Davis and does not address the essential problem of unfairness-that
one party to a divorce may bear the tax burden and the other may not.
The final tax result, determined not by section 1041 but by a number of
variables comprising the prior tax history of the property, eludes the
mechanical reckoning promised by a tax simplification act.
